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Abstract—Time Series Classification (TSC) problems are en-
countered in many real life data mining tasks ranging from
medicine and security to human activity recognition and food
safety. With the recent success of deep neural networks in
various domains such as computer vision and natural language
processing, researchers started adopting these techniques for
solving time series data mining problems. However, to the best of
our knowledge, no previous work has considered the vulnerability
of deep learning models to adversarial time series examples,
which could potentially make them unreliable in situations where
the decision taken by the classifier is crucial such as in medicine
and security. For computer vision problems, such attacks have
been shown to be very easy to perform by altering the image and
adding an imperceptible amount of noise to trick the network into
wrongly classifying the input image. Following this line of work,
we propose to leverage existing adversarial attack mechanisms to
add a special noise to the input time series in order to decrease
the network’s confidence when classifying instances at test time.
Our results reveal that current state-of-the-art deep learning time
series classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial attacks which can
have major consequences in multiple domains such as food safety
and quality assurance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Time Series Classification (TSC) problems are encountered
in various real world data mining tasks ranging from health
care [1]–[3] and security [4], [5] to food safety [6], [7] and
power consumption monitoring [8], [9]. As deep learning
models have revolutionized many machine learning fields such
as computer vision [10] and natural language processing [11],
[12], researchers recently started to adopt these models for
TSC tasks [13].
Following the advent of deep learning, researchers started
to study the vulnerability of deep networks to adversarial
attacks [14]. In the context of image recognition, an adver-
sarial attack consists in modifying an original image so that
the changes are almost undetectable by a human [14]. The
modified image is called an adversarial image, which will
be misclassified by the neural network, while the original
one is correctly classified. One of the most famous real-
life attacks consists in altering a traffic sign image so that
it is misinterpreted by an autonomous vehicle [15]. Another
application is the alteration of illegal content to make it
undetectable by automatic moderation algorithms [14]. The
most common attacks are gradient-based methods, where the
attacker modifies the image in the direction of the gradient
of the loss function with respect to the input image thus
increasing the misclassification rate [14], [16], [17].
While these approaches have been intensely studied in the
context of image recognition (e.g. NIPS competition on Ad-
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Fig. 1: Example of a perturbed time series that is misclassified
by a deep network after applying a small perturbation (time
series from the Coffee dataset [22] containing spectrographs
of coffee beans).
versarial Vision Challenge), adversarial attacks haven not been
thoroughly explored for TSC. This is surprising as deep learn-
ing models are getting more and more popular to classify time
series [2], [9], [18]–[21]. Furthermore, potential adversarial
attacks are present in many applications where the use of time
series data is crucial. For example, Figure 1 shows an original
and perturbed time series of coffee beans spectrographs. While
a deep neural network correctly classifies the original time
series as Robusta beans, adding small perturbations makes
it classify it as Arabica. Therefore, since Arabica beans are
more valuable than Robusta beans, this attack could be used
to deceive food control tests and eventually the consumers.
In this paper, we present, transfer and adapt adversarial
attacks that have been shown to work well on images to time
series data. We also present an experimental study using the
85 datasets of the UCR archive [22] which reveals that neural
networks are prone to adversarial attacks. We highlight specific
real-life use cases to stress the importance of such attacks
in real-life settings, namely food quality and safety, vehicle
sensors and electricity consumption. Our findings show that
deep networks for time series data are vulnerable to adversarial
attacks like their computer vision counterparts. Therefore, this
paper sheds the light on the need to protect against such
attacks, especially when deep learning is used for sensitive
TSC applications. We also show that adversarial time series
learned using one network architecture can be transferred to
different architectures. Finally, we discuss some mechanisms
to prevent these attacks while making the models more robust
to adversarial examples.
To summarize, the main contributions of this paper are:
• The definition and formalization of adversarial attacks for
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TSC tasks.
• The transfer and adaptation of image-based attacks to
time series data.
• An empirical study of these methods on the UCR archive
datasets.
• A set of use-cases that highlight the importance of such
attacks in real-life scenarios.
• An open-source framework to generate adversarial time
series.
• A set of adversarial time series for each dataset in the
UCR archive.
• A list of open issues to be considered in future research
on this topic.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we start with the necessary definitions
for ease of understanding. We then follow by an overview
of critical applications based on deep learning approaches
for TSC where adversarial attacks could have serious and
dangerous consequences. Finally, we present a brief survey
of the current state-of-the-art methods for adversarial attacks
which have been mainly proposed and validated on image
datasets [14].
Definition 1: A time series X = [x1, x2, . . . , xT ] is an
ordered set of real values. The length of X is equal to the
number of real values T .
Definition 2: D = {(X1, Y1), . . . , (XN , YN )} is a dataset
of pairs (Xi, Yi) where Xi is a time series with Yi as its
corresponding one-hot label vector.
Definition 3: Time Series Classification (TSC) task consists
of training a classifier on D in order to map from the space
of possible inputs to a probability distribution over the class
variable values (labels).
Definition 4: f(·) ∈ F : RT → Yˆ represents a deep learning
model for TSC.
Definition 5: Jf (·, ·) denotes the loss function (e.g. cross-
entropy) of the model f .
Definition 6: X
′
denotes the adversarial example, a per-
turbed version of X (the original instance) such that Yˆ 6= Yˆ ′
and ‖X −X ′‖p ≤ .
A. Deep learning for time series classification
Since AlexNet [10] won the ImageNet competition in 2012,
deep learning has seen a lot of successful applications in
various domains such as reaching human level performance in
image recognition problems [13] as well as different natural
language processing tasks [11]. Motivated by this success,
researchers and data mining practitioners started adopting
these deep machine learning models in various real life TSC
problems [2], [5], [9], [13], [19], [23]. In fact, deep Convolu-
tional Neural Networks (CNNs) were shown to achieve state-
of-the-art performance for TSC when evaluated over the UCR
archive benchmark. Specifically, by sliding one dimensional
filters over the input time series, the network is able to learn
discriminative, non-linear and time invariant features useful for
classification. For a more comprehensive description on how
deep CNNs are being adapted for one dimensional temporal
data, we refer the interested reader to our recent empirical
study of deep learning models for TSC [13].
In this paper, we focus on the application of deep neural
networks in crucial and sensitive decision making systems,
thus motivating the investigation of neural network’s vulner-
abilities to adversarial examples. In [2], CNNs were used
to mine temporal electronic health data for risk prediction
and disease sub-typing. In situations where algorithms are
taking the decision for reimbursement of medical treatment,
tampering medical records in an imperceptible manner could
eventually lead to fraud. Apart from the health care industry,
deep CNNs are also being used when monitoring power
consumption from houses or factories. For example in [9],
time series data from smart grids were analyzed for electricity
theft detection, where in such use cases perturbed data can help
thieves to avoid being detected. Other crucial decision making
systems such as malware detection in smart-phones, leverage
temporal data in order to classify if an Android application is
malicious or not [5]. Using adversarial attacks, a hacker might
generate synthetic data from his/her application allowing it to
bypass the security systems and get it installed on the end
user’s smart-phone. Finally, when deep neural networks are
deployed for road anomaly detection [23], perturbing the data
recorded by sensors placed on the road could help the entities
responsible for such life threatening anomalies, to avoid being
captured. We should note that due to space limitations, this
list of potential attacks is not exhaustive.
B. Adversarial attacks
Szegedy et al. [24] were the first to introduce adversarial
examples against deep neural networks for image recognition
tasks in 2014. Following these intriguing findings, a huge
amount of research has been dedicated to generating, under-
standing and preventing adversarial attacks on deep neural
networks [15]–[17].
Most of these methods have been proposed for image
recognition tasks [14]. For example, in [16], a fast gradient-
based attack was developed as an alternative to expensive
optimization techniques [24], where the authors explained the
presence of such adversarial examples with the hypothesis
of linearity for deep learning models. This kind of attack
was also extended by a more costly iterative procedure [17],
where the authors showed for the first time that even printed
adversarial images (i.e. perceived by a camera) are able to
fool a pre-trained network. More recently, it has been shown
that perturbing stop signs can trick autonomous vehicles into
misclassifying it as a speed limit sign [15].
Other fields such as Natural Language Processing have also
been investigated to create adversarial attacks such as adding
distracting phrases at the end of a paragraph in order to show
that deep learning-based reading comprehension systems were
not able to distinguish subtle differences in text [25]. For a
review on the different adversarial attacks for deep learning
systems, we refer the interested readers to a recent survey
in [14].
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Fig. 2: Example of perturbing the classification of an input time series from the TwoLeadECG dataset by adding an imperceptible
noise computed using the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM).
For general TSC tasks, it is surprising how adversarial attack
approaches have been ignored by the community. The only
previous work mentioning attacks for TSC is [26]. By adapting
a soft K Nearest Neighbors (KNN) coupled with Dynamic
Time Warping (DTW), the authors showed that adversarial
examples could fool the proposed nearest neighbors classifier
on a single simulated dataset (synthetic control from the UCR
archive [22]). However, the fact that the KNN classifier is
no longer considered as the state-of-the-art classifier for time
series data [27], we believe that it is important to investigate
the generation of adversarial time series examples that deterio-
rate the accuracy of state-of-the-art classifiers such a Residual
Network (ResNet) [13], [19] and to validate it on the whole
85 datasets in the UCR archive. Finally, we formally define
an adversarial attack on deep neural networks for TSC.
Definition 7: Given a trained deep learning model f and
an original input time series X , generating an adversarial in-
stance X
′
can be described as a box-constrained optimization
problem.
min
Xθ
‖X ′ −X‖ s.t.
f(X
′
) = Yˆ ′ , f(X) = Yˆ and Yˆ 6= Yˆ ′ (1)
Let η = X−X ′ be the perturbation added to X , which corre-
sponds to a very low amplitude signal. Figure 2 illustrates this
process where the green time series corresponds to the added
perturbation η. The optimization problem in (1) minimizes the
perturbation while misclassifying the input time series.
III. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS FOR TIME SERIES
In this section, we describe the ResNet architecture and
present two attack methods that we then use to generate
adversarial time series examples for the ResNet model.
A. Residual Network
ResNet was originally proposed for TSC in [19], where it
was validated on 44 datasets from the UCR archive [22]. In
a recent empirical evaluation [13] on the 85 datasets from
the UCR archive, we identified that ResNet achieved state-of-
the-art performance for TSC, with results that are not signif-
icantly different than the Collective Of Transformation-based
Ensembles, the current state-of-the-art classifier, which is an
ensemble of 35 classifiers [27]. Note that our adversarial attack
methods are independent of the chosen network architecture,
and that we chose ResNet for its robustness [13] as well as its
use in many critical domains such as malware detection [23].
In addition, adversarial examples are known to be transferable
across different neural network architectures which enables
the synthetic time series to fool other deep learning models:
a technique known as black-box attack [14].
Figure 3 illustrates the adopted architecture in our adversar-
ial attack experiments. The network’s input is a time series of
length T . The output of the network is a probability distribu-
tion over the K possible classes in the dataset. The first nine
layers are convolutional layers with the Rectified Linear Unit
(ReLU) as activation function [10]. Each convolutional layer
is followed by a batch normalization operation [28]. In each
convolutional block, the first, second and third convolutions
are composed respectively of filters of length 8, 5 and 3.
The first, second and last convolutional blocks are comprised
respectively of 64, 128 and 128 filters. For all convolutions
the stride is set to 1.
Each convolutional layer takes as input a time series and
applies a non-linearity to transform it into a multivariate time
series whose dimensions are inferred from the number of
filters in each layer. The tenth layer is composed of a Global
Average Pooling (GAP) operation which takes the output of
the third convolutional block and averages the time series
over the time dimension. This averaging operation reduces
drastically the number of parameters in a deep model while
enabling the use of a class activation map which allows an
interpretation of the learned features [19]. The output of layer
ten is then fed to a softmax classification layer whose number
of neurons is equal to the number of classes K in the dataset.
The network is trained for 1500 epochs using Adam [29]
(with default hyperparameters) to minimize the objective cost
function: cross-entropy.
B. Fast Gradient Sign Method
FGSM was first proposed in [16] to generate adversarial
images that fooled the famous GoogLeNet model. FGSM is
considered “fast” and replaces the expensive linear search
input time
series output
classes
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Fig. 3: The deep Residual Network (ResNet) architecture for Time Series Classification (TSC).
method previously proposed in [24]. The attack is based on a
one step gradient update along the direction of the gradient’s
sign at each time stamp. The perturbation process (illustrated
in Figure 2) can be expressed as:
η =  · sign(∇xJ(X, Yˆ )) (2)
where  denotes the magnitude of the perturbation (a hy-
perparameter). The adversarial time series X
′
can be easily
generated with X
′
= X + η. The gradient can be efficiently
computed using back-propagation.
C. Basic Iterative Method
BIM extends FGSM by applying it multiple times with a
small step size and clip the obtained time series elements after
each step to ensure that they are in an -neighborhood of the
original time series [17]. In fact, by adding smaller changes
or perturbations in an iterative manner, the method is able to
generate adversarial examples that are closer to the original
samples and have a better chance of fooling the network.
Algorithm 1 shows the different steps of this iterative attack
which requires setting three hyperparameters: (1) the number
of iterations I; (2) the amount of maximum perturbation  and
(3) the per step small perturbation α. In our experiments we
have set  = 0.1 heuristically similarly to [16], [17] and the
rest of BIM hyperparameters were left at their default value
in the Cleverhans API [30].
IV. RESULTS
A. Experimental setup
To train the deep neural network, we leveraged the parallel
computation of a cluster of more than 60 GPUs (a mix of GTX
1080 Ti, Tesla K20, K40 and K80). All of our experiments
were evaluated on the 85 datasets from the publicly available
UCR archive [22]. The model was trained/tested using the
original training/testing splits provided in the archive. To
perform the attacks, we have adapted the Cleverhans API [30]
Algorithm 1 Iterative Adversarial Attack
Parameter: I , , α
Input: original time series X & its label Yˆ
1: Output: perturbed time series X
′
2: X
′ ← X
3: for i = 1 to I do
4: η = α · sign(∇xJ(X ′ , Yˆ ))
5: X
′
= X
′
+ η
6: X
′
= min{X + ,max{X − ,X ′}}
7: end for
by extending the well known attacks for time series data and
perturbed only the test instances without using the test labels,
similarly to the computer vision literature [14].
For reproducibility and to allow the time series community
to verify and build on our findings, the source code for
generating adversarial time series is publicly available on our
GitHub repository1. In addition, we provide on our companion
web page2 the raw results, our pre-trained models as well as
a set of perturbed time series for each dataset in the UCR
archive. This would allow time series data mining practitioners
to test the robustness of their machine learning models against
adversarial attacks.
B. Results on the whole UCR archive
For all datasets, both attacks managed to reduce ResNet’s
accuracy. One exception is the DiatomSizeReduction dataset
which is the smallest one in the archive with an already
low original accuracy equal to 30% due to overfitting [13].
Figure 4 shows the accuracy variation for both attacks with
respect to the network’s original accuracy on the UCR archive.
On average, over the 85 datasets, FGSM and BIM managed
to reduce the model’s accuracy respectively by 43.2% and
1https://github.com/hfawaz/ijcnn19attacks
2https://germain-forestier.info/src/ijcnn2019/
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Fig. 4: Accuracy variation for two attacks (FGSM and BIM)
with respect to ResNet’s original accuracy.
56.89%. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicates that BIM
is significantly better than FGSM in decreasing the model’s
accuracy, with a p-value ≤ 10−15. However, we should note
that FGSM is a fast approach allowing real-time generation of
adversarial time series whereas BIM is time-consuming and
requires a certain number of iterations I .
By analyzing the use-cases where both attacks failed to fool
the classifier, we found out that the corresponding datasets
have two interesting characteristics that could explain the
classifier’s robustness to adversarial examples. The first one
is that 50% of the simulated datasets (CBF, Two patterns and
synthetic control) in the archive are in the top six hardest
datasets to attack. Perhaps since these are synthetic datasets
generated by humans to serve some human intuition for TSC,
small perturbations imperceptible by humans, are not enough
to alter the classifier’s decision. The second observation is that
a network trained on datasets with time series of short length
is harder to fool. This is rather expected since the less data
points we have, the less amount of perturbation the attacker is
allowed to add. For example ItalyPowerDemand contains the
shortest sequences (T = 24) and is the second most hardest
use-case for both attacks.
C. Multi-Dimensional Scaling
We used Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS) [31], [32] with
the objective to gain some insights on the spatial distribution of
the perturbed time series compared to the original ones. MDS
uses a pairwise distance matrix as input and aims at placing
each object in an N-dimensional space such as the between-
object distances are preserved as well as possible. Using the
Euclidean Distance (ED) on a set of time series (original and
perturbed), it is then possible to create a similarity matrix
and apply MDS to display the set into a two dimensional
space. The latter straightforward approach supposes that the
ED is able to strongly separate the raw time series, which
is usually not the case evident by the low accuracy of the
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Fig. 5: Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) showing the distri-
bution of perturbed time series on the whole test set of the
Ham dataset where the accuracy decreased from 80% to 21%
after performing the BIM attack.
nearest neighbor when coupled with the ED [27]. Therefore,
we decided to use the linearly separable representation of
time series from the output of the GAP layer, which is
used as input to the softmax linear classifier (multinomial
logistic regression). More precisely, for each input time series,
the last convolution outputs a multivariate time series whose
dimensions are equal to the number of filters (128) in the
last convolution, then the GAP layer averages the latter 128-
dimensional multivariate time series over the time dimension
resulting in a vector of 128 real values over which the ED is
computed. This enables the MDS projection to be as close as
possible to ResNet’s latent representation of the time series.
As we worked with the ED, we used Metric MDS [31] that
minimizes a cost function called Stress which is a residual
sum of squares:
StressD(X1, . . . , XN ) =
(∑
i,j
(
dij − ‖xi − xj‖
)2∑
i,j d
2
ij
)1/2
(3)
where dij is the ED between the GAP vectors of time series
Xi and Xj . Obviously, one has to be careful about the
interpretation of MDS output, as the data space is highly
simplified (each time series Xi is represented as a single data
point xi).
D. Attacks on food quality and safety
The determination of food quality, type and authenticity
along with the detection of adulteration are major issues in
the food industry [7]. With meat related product, authenticity
checking concerns for example the identification of substi-
tution of high value raw materials with cheaper materials
like less costly cuts, offal, blood, water, eggs or other types
of proteins. These substitutions not only decease the con-
sumers but can also cause severe allergic responses as the
substitute materials are hidden. Discriminating meat that has
been frozen-and-thawed from fresh meat is also an important
issue, as refreezing food can result in an increased amount of
bacteria. Spectroscopic methods have been historically very
successful at evaluating the quality of agricultural products,
especially food [7]. This technique is routinely used as a
quality assurance tool to determine the composition of food
ingredients.
In this context, an adversarial attack could be used to modify
recorded spectrographs (seen as time series) in order to hide
the low qualify of the food. The Beef dataset [33] (from the
UCR archive) contains four classes of beef spectrograms, from
pure and adulterated beef with varying degrees of potential
adulterants (heart, tripe, kidney, and liver). An adversarial
attack could thus consist in modifying an adulterated beef to
make a network classify it as pure beef. For this dataset, FGSM
and BIM reduced the model’s accuracy respectively by 56.7%
and 66.7%.
The Ham dataset [34] contains measurements from 19
Spanish and 18 French dry-cured hams, with the goal to
distinguish the provenance of the food. An adversarial attack
could consist in perturbing the spectrograms to hide the real
provenance of the food. Figure 5 shows the MDS projection of
the original and perturbed instances for Ham’s test set, where
one can see that the adversarial examples are pushed toward
the other class.
The Coffee dataset [6] is a two class problem to distinguish
between Robusta and Arabica coffee beans. Arabica beans are
valued most highly by the trade, as they are considered to have
a finer flavor than Robusta. An adversarial attack could consist
in altering the spectrograms to make Robusta beans look like
Arabica beans. Figure 6 shows the MDS representation of
the original and perturbed time series from the test set. We
can clearly see how the instances are pushed toward the class
frontiers after performing the FGSM attack.
E. Attacks on vehicle sensors
The increase in the number of sensors and other electrical
devices has drastically augmented the amount of data produced
in the industry. These data are now routinely used to monitor
systems or to perform predictive maintenance and prevent
failures [35]. The car industry is not an exception with the
increasing number of sensors present in modern vehicles, espe-
cially for advanced driver assistance systems and autonomous
driving.
Data are also used to perform diagnostic on vehicles in order
to detect engine problems or compliance with environmental
regulations. In this context, an adversarial attack could consist
in altering sensor readings in order to hide a specific problem
or to pass a CO2 emission test. The famous “dieselgate” (or
“emissionsgate”) [36] made this kind of attack a reality as
multiple automakers have been suspected of using emission
control systems during laboratory emissions testing.
To illustrate this use case, we used the FordA datasets
(from the UCR archive) that was was originally used in a
competition in the IEEE World Congress on Computational
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Fig. 6: Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) showing the distri-
bution of perturbed time series on the whole test set of the
Coffee dataset where the accuracy decreased from 100% to
50% after performing the FGSM attack.
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Intelligence, 2008. The classification problem is to diagnose
whether a certain symptom exists or not in an automotive
subsystem. Each case consists of 500 measurements of engine
noise and a class label. In this context, an attack could consist
in hiding an engine problem. In practice for the FordA dataset,
the model’s accuracy decreased by 57.9% and 70.2% when
applying respectively the FGSM and BIM attacks.
Figure 7 depicts the variations of ResNet’s accuracy on
FordA with respect to the amount of perturbation  allowed
for the FGSM and BIM attacks. As expected [17], we found
that FGSM fails to generate adversarial examples that can fool
the network for larger values of , whereas the BIM produces
perturbed time series that can reduce a model’s accuracy to
almost 0.0%. This can be explained by the fact that BIM adds
a small amount of perturbation α on each iteration whereas
FGSM adds  amount of noise for each data point in the series
that may not be useful for misclassifying the test sample.
F. Attacks on electricity consumption
Smart meters are electronic devices that record electric
power consumption while sending information to the electric-
ity supplier for monitoring, billing and data analysis. These
meters typically register energy hourly and report back at
least once a day to the supplier by leveraging a two-way
communication channel between the device and the supplier’s
central system. These smart meters have raised a set of con-
cerns in public opinion especially because they send detailed
information about how much electricity is being used for each
time stamp. Precisely, it has been shown that it is possible to
know exactly which type of electric device is or has been used
from simply analyzing the electricity consumption data [8]. In
this context, an attack could consist in modifying the electricity
consumption time series of one device to make it recognized
as another in order to hide which devices are actually used by
a specific user.
To illustrate this use case, we used the SmallKitchenAp-
pliances dataset from the UCR archive that was recorded
as part of government sponsored study called Powering the
Nation [8]. By collecting and analyzing behavioural data about
consumers’ daily use of electricity within their homes, the goal
is to reduce the UK’s carbon footprint. The dataset contains
readings from 251 households recorded over a month. Each
univariate time series has a length equal to 720 corresponding
to 24 hours of readings taken every two minutes. The three
classes are: Kettle, Microwave and Toaster. For this dataset,
FGSM and BIM managed to reduce the classifier’s accuracy
respectively by 38.4% and 57%.
The ItalyPowerDemand dataset [37], another dataset from
the UCR archive, contains twelve monthly electrical power
demand time series from Italy. The task is to differentiate
between instances that correspond to winter months (Octo-
ber to March) and summer months (April to September).
This dataset contains the shortest time series in the archive
(T = 24), thus requiring a higher amount of perturbation  in
order to be misclassified. Figure 8 shows the variation of the
model’s accuracy as well as the shape of a time series from
the ItalyPowerDemand dataset with respect to the amount of
noise that is added. For this example, both attacks needed
higher values of perturbation ( ≥ 0.3) rather than the default
setting ( = 0.1).
G. Transferability of adversarial examples
To evaluate the transferability of perturbed time series, we
used the Fully Convolutional Neural Network (FCN) which
was originally proposed in [19] and was recently shown to
be the second most accurate deep time series classifier [13]
when evaluated on the UCR archive [22]. We used the test sets
altered with FGSM and BIM using ResNet and try to classify it
with FCN (both were originally trained on the same train set).
For both FGSM and BIM attacks, FCN’s accuracy decreases
respectively by 38.2% and 42.8% which shows that adversarial
examples are capable of generalizing to a different network
architecture. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test also shows that
BIM is significantly better than FGSM in reducing FCN’s
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Fig. 8: Accuracy variation for ItalyPowerDemand with respect
to the perturbation  where FGSM managed to fool the
network with this example for  ≥ 0.3.
accuracy, with a p-value ≤ 10−7. This type of attacks is known
as “black box” where the attackers do not have access to the
target model’s internal parameters (FCN) yet they are able to
generate perturbed time series that fool the classifier.
H. How can we prevent such attacks ?
Countermeasures for adversarial attacks [14] follow two
defense strategies: (1) reactive: identify the perturbed instance;
(2) proactive: improve the network’s robustness without gen-
erating adversarial examples. One of the most straightforward
proactive methods is adversarial training, which consists of
(re)training the classifier with adversarial examples. Other
reactive techniques consist of detecting the adversarial ex-
amples during testing. However, most of these detectors are
still prone to attacks that are designed specifically to fool
the detectors [14]. Therefore, we think that the time series
community would have much to offer in this area by leveraging
the decades of research into non-probabilistic classifiers such
as the nearest neighbor coupled with DTW [38]. Running
classifiers against the adversarial examples that we provide in
this paper is a first step toward identifying vulnerable models
and making them more robust to such type of attacks.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced the concept of adversarial at-
tacks on deep learning models for time series classification. We
defined and adapted two attacks, originally proposed for image
recognition, for the TSC task. We showed how adversarial
perturbations are able to reduce the accuracy for the state-
of-the-art deep learning classifier (ResNet) when evaluated
on the UCR archive benchmark. With deep neural networks
becoming frequently adopted by time series data mining
practitioners in real-life critical decision making systems, we
shed the light on some crucial use cases where adversarial
attacks could have serious and dangerous consequences.
In the future, we would like to investigate countermeasures
techniques to defend machine learning models against such
attacks while exploring the transferability of adversarial ex-
amples to other non deep learning state-of-the-art classifiers.
Finally, we would like to further explore the dozens of
adversarial attacks that are published each year in order to
identify and protect vulnerable deep learning models for TSC.
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